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Abstract
One might assume that the desire to help (here described as Want) is the essential driver of helping declarations and/or 
behaviors. However, even if desire to help (Want) is low, intention to help may still occur if the expectancy regarding the 
perceived effectiveness of helping is high. We tested these predictions in a set of three experimental studies. In all three, 
we measured the desire to help (Want) and the Expectancy that the aid would be impactful for the victim; in addition, we 
manipulated Expectancy in Study 3. In Studies 1 and 3, we measured the participants’ declaration to help while in Study 2, 
their helping behavior was examined. In all three studies, we used variations of the same story about a victim. The results 
supported our hypothesis. Thus, the studies help to tease apart the determinants of helping under conditions of lowered desire 
to do so, an issue of great importance in public policymaking.
Keywords Intention to help · Helping behavior · Motivation to help · Social judgment · Social cognition
Introduction
Vast research on helping focuses on the desire to help, i.e., 
the feeling of wanting to do something to help victims (for 
an overview see: Butts et al. 2019). However, eliciting a 
high desire to help is not always easy or even possible. This 
is usually the case in public policy decisions. Moreover, 
factors such as personal values, religion, personal experi-
ence (Charities Aid Foundation 2013), or demographic vari-
ables (Wunderink 2002) may lower people’s desire to help. 
Indeed, recent reports show that these factors systematically 
decrease the levels of charity in many countries (Charities 
Aid Foundation 2019; Roy Morgan’s Data 2019). Thus, 
the question arises as to how to foster helping in situations 
where the initial desire to do so is relatively weak.
In this paper, we build on motivational readiness theory 
(Kruglanski et al. 2014) by examining the role of Expectancy 
in making decisions about charity donations. Expectancy 
in this case can be defined as the subjective assessment of 
the extent to which any aid will be impactful for the victim. 
One might assume that the desire to help (here described as 
Want) is the essential driver of helping declarations and/or 
behaviors. However, even if Want is low, declared or actual 
help may still occur if the Expectancy regarding the per-
ceived effectiveness of helping is high.
Although some researchers have implicated Expectancy 
as an influence on charitable-giving decisions (e.g., Ben-
dapudi et al. 1996; Cryder et al. 2013a, b; Sharma and 
Morwitz 2016), their focus was on the separate (or addi-
tive) effects of affective (Want) and cognitive (Expectancy) 
responses to a person in need. In contrast to this, we dem-
onstrate the interplay between these two factors, i.e., Want 
and Expectancy, via the results of three experimental studies 
presented in this paper. These help to tease apart the deter-
minants of helping under conditions of lowered desire to do 
so, an issue of great importance in public policymaking, and 
in the creation of successful fundraising strategies of many 
charity organizations.
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What motivates helping?
Many researchers consider the desire to help victims as 
one of the most prominent motive driving declared or 
actual help (Hofmann and Dillen 2012; Butts et al. 2019). 
Desire is usually defined as an affectively charged moti-
vation toward a certain object, person, or activity, whose 
satisfaction is associated with pleasure or a relief from 
displeasure (see Kavanagh et al. 2005). Indeed, different 
emotions, both negative and positive may accompany the 
desire to help and most psychological literature on helping 
focuses on analyzing these affective responses to people 
in need (e.g., Cialdini et al. 1987; Loewenstein and Small 
2007; Batson 2011; Kogut and Ritov 2005; Genevsky et al. 
2013; Cameron and Payne 2011; Butts et al. 2019).
On the other hand, studies have demonstrated that non-
affective factors may play a role here, too. For example, 
people are more likely to help if they believe that their con-
tribution will make a major impact (e.g., Bendapudi et al. 
1996). Helping motivation decreases if the overhead costs 
are perceived as high (Sargeant and Woodliffe 2007), but 
increases when people believe the benefits of helping out-
weigh the costs (Erlandsson et al. 2014). This motivation 
to help also increases when campaigns align with people’s 
goals; in this circumstance, donors feel that their contri-
bution will make a more substantial impact (Cryder et al. 
2013a, b). Other research has shown that people donate 
more money when they believe they are the only possible 
helper who can assist an identified child as opposed to 
when the belief is that there is a shared responsibility to 
help all children (Basil et al. 2006; Cryder and Loewen-
stein 2012). Sharma and Morwitz (2016), distinguishing 
between perceived self-efficacy (i.e., the belief that one 
can take the steps required to achieve an outcome) and 
response efficacy (i.e., the belief that the steps taken will 
result in the desired outcome), demonstrated that increas-
ing perceived self-efficacy increases perceived response 
efficacy, and donations to multiple beneficiaries. Also, 
recently, Touré-Tillery and Fishbach (2017) showed that 
the intention to help increases as the perceived impact of 
actions increases, such that the greater the expected impact 
of a contribution, that is, the greater the likelihood that the 
contribution will alleviate suffering, the more willingness 
there exists to take an action. In addition, Erlandsson et al. 
(2014) analyzed the role of perceived impact (also referred 
to as perceived utility or perceived efficacy) in explaining 
helping, showing that the higher the believed impact of 
the contribution, the more likely people are to help (see 
also Butts et al. 2019). All of the abovementioned results 
are in line with a survey conducted by the Charities Aid 
Foundation (2014); 72% of respondents declare that they 
‘invest in charities who demonstrate their impact clearly’ 
and 81% of them believe that ‘more hard evidence of the 
impact of charities’ work’ would positively influence their 
decision to donate money.
Interplay between affective and non‑affective 
factors in motivating helping
In the studies mentioned above, researchers tested the affec-
tive and non-affective factors underlying help separately; we 
propose to look at the interplay between them. According to 
motivational readiness theory (Kruglanski et al. 2014), the 
willingness or inclination to act in the service of a desire is 
determined by two factors: Want and Expectancy. The Want 
state is defined as an outcome that a person desires at a given 
moment (e.g., a desire to help). Expectancy is a subjective 
assessment of the gratification of the Want (e.g., a subjec-
tive assessment of the extent to which aid will be impact-
ful for the victim). Although both Want and Expectancy 
influence the inclination to act, they are not functionally 
equivalent in their effects. Certainly, desire (Want) seems 
critical and indispensable for undertaking any action. Expec-
tancy, though also contributing to motivational readiness, 
according to the theory, plays more of an assisting role. The 
theory allows for the possibility of motivational readiness 
even where the Expectancy is absent. In contrast, if Want 
is entirely gone, no amount of Expectancy would suffice to 
rekindle one’s extinguished readiness.
It is worth stressing however that unlike in classic moti-
vational models in which the Want and Expectancy factors 
are typically portrayed as fully independent from each other 
(e.g., Atkinson 1964; Hull 1943; Spence 1956; Tolman 
1955), the motivational readiness theory indicated that they 
are in fact interdependent and that each may partially deter-
mine the other under some conditions (see also Dunning 
1999; Kunda 1990; Kunda and Sinclair 1999). For example, 
at high degree of Want the individual may develop a hope 
of attainment even where objective Expectancy of attain-
ment was low, demonstrating wishful thinking (McGuire 
1960; Bélanger et al. 2016). Similar “motivated distortions” 
were discussed also in other areas and suggest that when 
people really want something, they find it more achieva-
ble and likely (or unlikely in case of something they find 
highly undesirable, see Kruglanski 1999; Kruglanski and 
Ajzen 1983). The higher the Want, the greater the tendency 
to distort reality, or subordinate it to the dominant desire. 
Nonetheless, the Want factor has major determinants other 
than expectancy, for example the degree of deprivation (as 
in hunger) or magnitude of the incentive (e.g. the tastiness 
of the food). Thus, we expect that Want and Expectancy 
even though partially linked, are still largely independent of 
each other, hence they constitute mostly separate sources of 
behavioral intentions.
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In summary then, we assume that Want is a fundamental 
factor in predicting declared or actual help. If desire is at a 
high level, Expectancy is not essential to take an action, as 
long as it reaches a minimal threshold level. However, if 
Want to help others is flagging, declared or actual help may 
still occur when prompted by high degrees of Expectancy. In 
such a circumstance (i.e., low Want, high Expectancy), the 
magnitude of readiness to help is smaller compared to the 
situation of high Want, due to the crucial role of the latter; 
however, the declared or actual help should still be exhibited.
Overview of the studies
We tested the foregoing predictions in a set of three experi-
mental studies.1 In all three, we measured the desire to help 
(Want) and the Expectancy that the aid would be impact-
ful for the victim; in addition, we manipulated Expectancy 
in Study 3. In Studies 1 and 3, we measured the partici-
pants’ declaration of their intention to help. We are aware 
that desire to help (Want) and declaration/intention to help 
might be seen as difficult to distinguish. It is because within 
attitude theory the concepts of desires and intentions are not 
differentiated but are often treated as synonyms. However, 
Perugini and Bagozzi (2004) demonstrated that there are 
theoretical reasons for distinguishing between desires and 
intentions. Also, an emerging literature shows that desires 
strongly influence intentions and substantially mediate 
most of the effects of attitudes, subjective norms, perceived 
behavioral control, and other personal reasons for acting 
on intentions (e.g. Bagozzi and Edwards 1998a, b). Trying 
to distinguish between desire and intention, Perugini and 
Bagozzi (2004) indicate that intentions have a stronger con-
nection to goals or outcomes than desires because they imply 
a commitment, and encompass at least some form of partial 
planning to achieve the goals or outcomes (Bratman 1987), 
whereas desires do not. The emphasis on goals, represent-
ing combinations of Wants and Expectancies have inspired 
recent advances in the theory of reasoned action (see, Krug-
lanski et al. 2016; Ajzen and Kruglanski 2019).
Intentions to act are directly connected to a multitude of 
activities and outcomes related to the choice of means for 
action implementation, impediments to action, temptations 
to perform other actions or consider other goals, cues for 
retrieval of the intention at a future point in time, and so 
forth (Bagozzi and Edwards 2000). Also, within the moti-
vational readiness theory the two constructs can be distin-
guished. Want produces motivational readiness, however, 
intention is formed only after the commitment point is 
passed, that is a goal is formed. For the latter, a minimum 
level of Expectancy is also needed. For instance, one might 
desire to climb Mount Everest, however, they may form the 
intention to do so (and actually climb it) only when they find 
it feasible (i.e. expectancy of success is above threshold), 
hence committing to the goal to climb.
Our three studies contained common elements allowing 
convergence but also contained unique features that com-
plemented each other. Whereas in Study 1 we examined 
behavioral intentions in Study 2 we additionally examined 
participants helping behavior, instead of mere declarations 
of intention. In Studies 1 and 3, we also measured nega-
tive affect. As we did not have specific predictions about 
its impact, the results for this variable are presented in Sup-
plementary Materials.
In all three studies, we used variations of the same story 
about a victim. The basic version of the story read as follows:
A 5-year old boy/girl, who suffers from a serious kid-
ney condition, is now in hospital. The condition will 
soon lead to kidney failure, which will put the boy’s/
girl’s life in danger. For medical reasons, a kidney 
transplant is impossible as is hemodialysis. However, 
a medication which can stop the disease has been 
recently discovered. Unfortunately, health insurance 
will not pay for it in Poland, and the treatment is very 
expensive. If the amount of 500,000 PLN is not col-
lected shortly, the progress of the disease will be so 
advanced that it will be impossible to save the boy/girl.
In all our studies, we tested the interactive effect of the 
desire to help (Want) and Expectancy, and hypothesized that, 
at high levels of Want, Expectancy would not matter; that 
is, the desire to help would be the sole significant predictor 
of the magnitude of the (intended) help. At the same time, 
we also hypothesized that at lower levels of Want, Expec-
tancy would significantly predict helping declarations and 
behaviors.
In order to determine the samples size, we ran an a priori 
power analysis with the use of G*Power 3.1 (Faul et al. 
2009). As for estimates of effect sizes in Studies 1 and 3, 
they were based on what is typically done in the discipline 
when the effect size is unknown (i.e. medium effect size is 
assumed). Since in our studies we expected a significant 
effect of Expectancy only at low levels of Want, this is where 
we assumed a medium effect size (β = 0.5). At high levels of 
Want we assumed no significant effect of Expectancy (effect 
1 In Studies 1 and 2, we manipulate the Want by identifiability of the 
victim (i.e., whether identifying information, such as the name, was 
present or not) in order to evoke emotions related to the victim. Since 
there were no effects stemming from this manipulation on any of the 
variables described in the paper (see Supplementary Materials), this 
manipulation has been omitted from further analyses. It is worth not-
ing that the fact that manipulation was not effective does not mean 
that the studies are not reliable, since other researchers have also 
failed to confirm the identified victim effect (see meta-analyses by 
Hart et al. 2018; Lee and Feeley 2016). No additional manipulations 
or measures were included.
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equal to β = 0), so the expected difference between condi-
tions was equal to 0.5. Such a difference produces an effect 
size of  f2 = 0.07 for the interaction (rather small effect). 
This is what we entered in our analyses. In Study 2, we also 
assumed a rather small effect for the whole interaction (odds 
ratio equals to 2). In all studies, we strived for achieving at 
least 0.90 power.
The Local Research Ethics Committee approved all stud-
ies. Thus, data collection complied with current APA Ethical 
Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct. The data 
is available at https ://osf.io/g5pe6 /?view_only=37544 6b415 
7a482 3b814 a8505 c1918 25.
Method
Study 1
In Study 1, we checked if increased Expectancy predicts dec-
larations regarding readiness to help even when the desire 
to help is low. We thus ran an online study in which we 
presented participants with a helping scenario and recorded 
their declared intentions to help. Their desire to help (Want) 
and the Expectancy that the help would be impactful were 
measured as well. We investigated whether the interaction 
between the two factors predicts the declared magnitude of 
the help.
Participants
A priori power analysis with the use of G*Power 3.1 (Faul 
et al. 2009) showed that a sample of at least 153 would be 
necessary to obtain the assumed power. Since the study was 
conducted online, we increased the sample size by 30% 
to take into account possible attritions and non-attentive 
responding. Accordingly, we aimed to recruit at least 204 
participants for this study.
Two hundred and nine registered users of the Research 
Online platform took part in the online experiment. There 
were 126 women and 83 men, aged between 18 and 84 
(M = 33.94, SD = 11.35). Sixty-eight participants had a high 
school education, and 5 had occupational education; 21 were 
students, and 115 had completed their higher education at 
the time of the study. Participants were paid for their partici-
pation in line with the rules of the platform (approx. 2 EUR). 
All participants gave informed consent before participation 
in the study, and they were debriefed on completion of the 
study.
Fourteen participants failed our attention check (see 
below). Therefore, the final sample consisted of N = 195 
participants (116 women, 79 men; with a mean of age 
M = 33.93, SD = 10.85).
Materials and procedure
In the study, we presented participants with a story of a 
child, or children, in need (it transpired that the version of 
the story was unimportant, see Supplementary Materials). 
Then, the participants’ desire to help, and expectancy in rela-
tion to the satisfaction of this desire, were measured. Want 
was measured using one item: To what extent is it important 
for you to help [the victim]? (1–7 scale anchored with not 
at all important and definitely important). We also used an 
additional item: Do you want to help in this situation? But 
we decided not to include it to the analysis as it is linked 
too close to measure of intention. We however re-analyzed 
data using both items and the results were the same. Along-
side this, Expectancy2 (Cronbach’s α = 0.81, M = 5.08, 
SD = 0.93) was measured with four items: (1) In your opin-
ion, by donating, will you effectively help [the victim]? (2) 
In your opinion, will the necessary amount be collected? (3) 
In your opinion, if the necessary amount is collected, will it 
be possible to save…? (4) In your opinion, are actions like 
this effective? (1–7 Scale anchored with definitely not and 
absolutely). Indices of Want and Expectancy were obtained 
by averaging responses to the respective items. The order of 
Want and Expectancy items was counterbalanced.
Finally, participants were asked about their donation dec-
larations with the following question: What amount would 
you be willing to donate to this cause? (Participants were 
asked to mark an amount on a slider). The minimum amount 
was 0 PLN, and the maximum was 100 PLN, with responses 
possible in 1 PLN increments. We decided to set an upper 
limit to make sure that all participants operated within a 
given range and that their donation decisions would not 
be influenced by other factors (e.g., their socio-economic 
status).
In addition, we decided to control for the participants’ 
gender and attitude towards money as these variables may 
influence the declarations to donate or actual donation. 
Indeed, some research show that women are likely to give 
and give more than man in similar situations (Mesch et al. 
2011; Cox and Deck 2006; Anderoni and Vesterlund 2001). 
Besides, it is already known that people differ in their atti-
tudes towards money, that money attitudes are mostly inde-
pendent from income, and money perceptions are an addi-
tional important factor in the understanding of charitable 
behavior (Wiepking and Breeze 2011). Thus, even though 
participants did not donate actual money, their decisions 
could be influenced by their attitude towards spending. 
Therefore, we asked participants to rate to what extent they 
2 It is worth noting that Expectancy refers not only to the assessment 
of an individual’s impact on the victim, but also to the assessment of 
the extent to which aid will be impactful for the victim.
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agreed with the following statements: (1) I attach a lot of 
importance to money. (2) I appreciate the value of money. 
(3) I carefully think about each zloty spent. (4) Money is 
important in my life (1–7 scale from definitely disagree to 
definitely agree). Responses to all items were averaged and 
the resulting score was entered into the analyses as a statisti-
cal control (reported in the Supplementary Materials).
Since the study was run online, we also included an atten-
tion check. Specifically, we added a question in which we 
asked participants to mark response number 3.
Results and discussion
Means and intercorrelations between variables are presented 
in Table 1. As Want and Expectancy are correlated, we 
explored the variance inflation factor (VIF) to be sure that 
performing interaction is accurate (Freund et al. 2003). As 
VIF equals 1.37, we performed interaction analysis. To test 
the interactional hypothesis, we regressed Want, Expectancy, 
and the product of the two on the donation (log transformed 
prior to the analyses due to the skewness in the data, DV’s 
skewness = 1.28). The analyses were performed with the use 
of Process macro for SPSS version 2.13 (Hayes 2013). In all 
analyses, bias corrected bootstrap confidence intervals are 
reported; 10,000 bootstrap samples were used in all analy-
ses. All variables were standardized prior to analyses.
The results showed that both Want and Expectancy sig-
nificantly predicted declarations to donate, β = 0.48, t = 7.26, 
p < 0.001, 95% CI [0.35, 0.61] for Want, and β = 0.21, 
t = 3.23, p = 0.001, 95% CI [0.08, 0.34], for Expectancy. 
Importantly, however, there was a significant interaction, 
β =  − 0.10, t =  − 2.10, p = 0.04, 95% CI [− 0.19, 0.00]. Con-
ditional effects analysis showed that, whereas there were no 
significant effects of Expectancy at high (+ 1 SD) values 
of Want, β = 0.12, t = 1.45, p = 0.15, 95% CI [− 0.04, 0.28], 
there was a significant effect of Expectancy at low (− 1 SD) 
values of Want, β = 0.27, t = 3.94, p < 0.001, 95% CI [0.14, 
0.41]. The interaction is graphically presented in Fig. 1.
We re-ran the analyses while controlling for gender and 
attitudes towards money, and they yielded similar results 
(see Table 1 in Supplementary Materials).
The results thus demonstrated that, although a desire to 
help (Want) is a crucial factor influencing on declarations to 
donate, if it is low, Expectancy that the donation is effective 
matters as well. Specifically, when the desire to help was 
high, Expectancy did not seem to affect the donation. How-
ever, when the desire to help was low, Expectancy became 
a significant predictor, with high Expectancy levels signifi-
cantly increasing the declared amount.
Study 2
The aim of Study 2 was to replicate the results described 
above in a laboratory setting. In addition, we also focused on 
actual helping behavior, not merely on declarations to donate 
as in Study 1. It is important extension of Study 1 as dec-
larations made by people about how they behave might not 
always be consistent with their overt behavior (see Doliński 
2018). Thus, it is crucial to demonstrate that our predic-
tions hold also when actual helping behavior is taken into 
account. Therefore, we set up a laboratory experiment con-
nected with a charity fundraiser in which participants could 
donate money earned in the lab to a person in need. As in the 
previous study, Want and Expectancy were measured, and 
we tested whether they interactively predicted participation 
in the fundraiser (i.e., in the form of offering help).
Participants
We ran an a priori power analysis for logistic regression with 
a power of 0.90 and odds ratio of 2. The analysis showed that 
a sample size of at least 106 participants would be necessary 
to obtain the assumed power. We intended to recruit more 
participants in case there were any data losses; we therefore 
endeavored to enroll at minimum 130 participants in the 
study.
We recruited 134 participants to take part in a labora-
tory study on solving cognitive tasks. The sample was com-
prised of young adults who answered an announcement at 
university websites and local internet portals. There were 
111 women and 21 men (2 participants did not provide 
their demographics) and they were aged between 18 and 
35 (M = 23.66, SD = 3.54). 63 Participants had received a 
high school education; 2 had occupational education, 2 basic 
education, and 65 higher education. 50 Participants were 
students, 20 were employed, 44 both studied and worked, 
and 18 were doing neither at the time of the experiment.
Table 1  Descriptive statistics and intercorrelations
* Significant
M SD 1 2
Study 1 (N = 195)
 (1) Want [1–7] 4.81 1.31
 (2) Expectancy [1–7] 5.08 0.93 .48*
 (3) Money donated [1–100 PLN] 27.01 26.07 .49* .36*
Study 2 (N = 134)
 (1) Want [1–7] 4.63 1.25
 (2) Expectancy [1–7] 5.02 1.35 .44*
 (3) Money donated [1–20 PLN] 3.62 4.72 .37* .26*
Study 3 (N = 190)
 (1) Want [1–7] 4.71 1.71
 (2) Expectancy [1–7] 5.13 1.13 .65*
 (3) Money donated [1–100 PLN] 26.11 24.14 .50* .34*
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Participants were paid 20 PLN (around 5 Euro) for par-
ticipation in the study. All subjects gave informed consent 
before participation in the study and were debriefed on its 
completion.
Materials and procedure
Participants were recruited to take part in a study on task 
solving. In this study, which took about an hour to com-
plete, they solved a set of computer tasks of low to medium 
difficulty. Participants worked in sessions of up to six par-
ticipants at the same time, each in a separate cubicle. After 
completing the task, they were paid the amount of 20 PLN 
(in one zloty coins; app. 4.5 Euro) and thanked for partici-
pation in the study. However, they were also informed that 
the study was run in cooperation with a local university 
charity organization which was currently raising money to 
help children in need. Each participant was presented with 
a description of the cause in writing, i.e., they read about a 
child suffering from a kidney disease (in one of the three 
versions, as presented in the Supplementary Materials; the 
version did not matter).
Participants were informed that if they decided to support 
the cause, their money would be given to the charity in full. 
They were also told that the fund-raiser was not part of the 
study and that donations were entirely voluntary so their 
decision to take part was entirely up to them. Nevertheless, 
all participants were asked to answer several questions, 
allegedly for evaluation purposes, even if they decided not 
to donate any money. The questionnaire aimed to measure 
the desire to help (Want), the expectancy that this desire 
would be satisfied (Expectancy), and to assess their attitude 
towards money. Since we wanted the participants to believe 
this was not a part of a study, we kept the questionnaire 
short and asked one question per each variable: To what 
extent is it important for you to help the child?—To measure 
Want; In your opinion, are campaigns like this effective?—
To measure Expectancy; and I carefully think about each 
zloty spent—to measure their attitude towards money (each 
responded on a 1–7 scale).
Participants answered the questions in their cubicles so 
that they could have some privacy and not feel pressured in 
any way. After answering the questions, they were asked to 
put the questionnaire, along with the amount (if any) they 
were willing to donate, in the envelope and leave it on the 
desk (as participants were paid in single zloty coins, they 
could leave any amount ranging from 1 to 20 PLN). After 
completing the study, they were informed that they would 
soon receive detailed information regarding the purpose of 
the study and confirmation of their financial donation to the 
charity organization via email.
In the follow-up email, the purpose of the study was 
explained to them, and they were provided with more infor-
mation about the charity organization to which the money 
Fig. 1  Interactive effect of Want and Expectancy on donation (Study 1)
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was donated (the organization was the Association for Aid to 
Children with Kidney Diseases associated under the auspice 
of Professor Marta Uszycka-Karcz, www.nefro logia dziec 
ieca.pl). A receipt for the money transfer was also attached.
Results and discussion
Means and intercorrelations between variables measured in 
this study are presented in Tables 1 and 2. As Want and 
Expectancy are correlated, we explored VIF index to be sure 
that performing interaction is accurate. As VIF equals 1.22, 
we performed interaction analysis.
Since it has been argued that observed behavior, unlike 
declarations, is often binary, and that it is the decision to 
donate or not that is of crucial importance (Doliński 2018), 
we analyzed the effects of Want and Expectancy on the deci-
sion to help. To that end, we ran logistic regression on the 
decision to help (0 when a participant did not donate any-
thing, 1 if they donated something).
The results showed that there was a significant effect of 
Want, b = 0.77, Z = 2.96, p = 0.003, 95% CI [0.27, 1.28], 
whereas Expectancy was non-significant, b = 0.20, Z = 0.86, 
p = 0.390, 95% CI [− 0.25, 0.65]. Importantly, however, 
there was a non-significant Want × Expectancy interaction, 
b =  − 0.53, Z =  − 1.86, p = 0.063, 95% CI [− 1.08, 0.03]. 
Conditional effects analysis showed that, whereas there were 
no significant effects of Expectancy at high (+ 1 SD) values 
of Want, b =  − 0.33, Z =  − 0.91, p = 0.364, 95% CI [− 1.05, 
0.39], there was a significant effect of Expectancy at low 
values of the moderator, b = 0.72, Z = 1.99, p = 0.047, 95% 
CI [0.01, 1.44]. The interaction is graphically presented in 
Fig. 2. Similar results were obtained when controlling for 
gender and attitudes towards money (see Table 11 in Sup-
plementary Materials).
To test if Want and Expectancy predicts the sum of dona-
tion (log transformed prior to the analyses due to the skew-
ness in the data, skewness = 1.58) we ran similar analyses 
as we did in Study 1. The results showed that there was no 
interactional effect of Want and Expectancy on donation, 
β =  − 0.02, t =  − 0.32, p = 0.748, 95% CI [− 0.16, 0.12]. 
Table 2  Mean differences for variables tested in Study 2 depending 
on decision to donate (N = 134)
M SD t p-value
Want
 No donation 4.08 1.41  − 3.88  < .001
 Donation 4.96 1.01
Expectancy
 No donation 4.61 1.60  − 2.5 .015
 Donation 5.26 1.12
Fig. 2  Probability of donating depending on Expectancy at different level of want (Study 2)
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Want was a significant predictor of donation, β = 0.35, 
t = 3.93, p < 0.001, 95% CI [0.17, 0.53], whereas Expectancy 
was not, β = 0.10, t = 1.08, p = 0.280, 95% CI [− 0.08, 0.28].
Thus, we demonstrated that, although it was the desire 
to help that mainly predicted helping behavior, when it was 
low, high Expectancy predicted donations as well. The study 
adds to the previous one by showing that the interactional 
effect of Want and Expectancy not only predicts declarations, 
but also the actual behavior subsequently displayed. Unlike 
in the previous study, we didn’t find significant effects on the 
amount of money donated, which might stem from the fact 
that this time we asked participants for real donations not 
just declarations. It is in line with the results of other stud-
ies investigating actual helping behaviors (vs. declarations), 
showing that the decision whether to donate differs from the 
decision on how much to donate (Parsons 2007; Karlan and 
Wood 2017; Bergh and Reinstein 2020).
Study 3
In Study 3, to more directly test if increased Expectancy may 
predict donations if desire to help is low, we manipulated the 
level of Expectancy by providing participants with informa-
tion about the chances of success of collecting the money 
for the given victim.
Participants
We calculated power for this study in a similar manner to 
that carried out for Study 1 but the interaction was calculated 
for the high and low Expectancy conditions rather than for 
high and low values of the moderator. The analysis yielded 
similar results and we aimed to recruit 204 participants for 
this study.
The sample was comprised of 205 participants. There 
were 167 women and 38 men ranging in age from 18 to 44 
(M = 23.19, SD = 3.91). All participants were enrolled in a 
lottery in which they could win three prizes of 50 PLN each. 
All subjects gave informed consent before participation in 
the study and were debriefed upon completion of the study.
Fifteen participants failed our attention check (see 
below). Therefore, the final sample comprised N = 190 par-
ticipants (156 women, 34 men; with the mean age M = 23.06, 
SD = 3.68).
Materials and procedure
Participants read a story about a child (or children) in need. 
Additionally, we manipulated the Expectancy of the fund-
raiser’s success by adding information about the amount of 
money that had been collected so far. One group of par-
ticipants was told that: The money collection is ending soon 
and, so far, only 50,000 PLN has been collected; this was 
the low Expectancy condition. Another group of partici-
pants was told: The money collection is ending soon and, 
so far, 450,000 PLN has already been collected; this was 
the high Expectancy condition. All participants were given 
the information that 500,000 PLN needed to be raised. We 
assumed that by informing participants about the progress 
of the fund-raiser, we would influence their expectations of 
success regarding the whole campaign. The manipulations 
used in each condition are presented in the Supplementary 
Materials.
We used the same measures of Want, Expectancy (Cron-
bach’s α = 0.75, M = 5.13, SD = 1.13), and donations as in 
Study 1. The participants’ attitudes toward money were also 
measured. An attention check question was also included 
(participants were asked to mark answer number 4).
Results and discussion
Descriptive statistics and intercorrelations between the vari-
ables are presented in Table 1. As Want and Expectancy are 
correlated, we explored VIF index to be sure that performing 
interaction is accurate. VIF equals 1.74, thus we performed 
analysis.
As predicted, the manipulation significantly affected 
Expectancy, F(1, 188) = 11.52, p = 0.001, partial η2 = 0.06 
(M = 4.84 in the low and M = 5.38 in the high Expectancy 
condition). There was no effect on Want, F(1, 188) = 0.80, 
p = 0.372.
Next, we tested whether our manipulation significantly 
predicted the magnitude of the donation (log transformed 
prior to the analyses due to the skewness in the data, skew-
ness = 1.16) via Expectancy at different levels of Want. We 
thus tested a moderated mediation model (Hayes 2013, 
model 14), with the manipulation as the IV, Expectancy as 
the mediator, Want as the moderator, and the donation as the 
DV (the model is pictured in Fig. 3). As in Study 1, the vari-
ables were log transformed prior to the analyses due to the 
skewness in the data. The analyses were performed with the 
use of Process macro for SPSS version 2.13 (Hayes 2013). 
In all analyses, bias corrected bootstrap confidence inter-
vals are reported; 10,000 bootstrap samples were used in all 
analyses. All variables were standardized prior to analyses.
The results showed a significant moderated mediation 
effect, IMM =  − 0.06, SE = 0.03, 95% CI [− 0.14, − 0.01], 
with the manipulation significantly predicting donations 
at low levels of Want, IE = 0.11, SE = 0.06, 95% CI [0.02, 
0.27]. The effect was not significant at high values of Want, 
IE =  − 0.004, SE = 0.06, 95% CI [− 0.12, 0.12], suggesting 
that when Want was high, it was of no consequence what 
our participants were told about the likelihood of collecting 
the necessary amount. The Want × Expectancy interaction 
is presented in Fig. 4.
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Thus, this study replicated our previous findings and 
provided further support for the interactive influence of 
Want and Expectancy on the declaration of donating. As 
in previous studies, Want was the main predictor of decla-
rations to help, and when it was high, the level of Expec-
tancy was immaterial. However, when Want was low, 
the amount of declared donations significantly increased 
with increasing Expectancy. Moreover, we showed that 
experimentally manipulating Expectancy translated into 
an increased willingness to help among participants who 
were not otherwise inclined to do so (i.e., those feeling 
low levels of Want).
Summary of the results
To present the results obtained in a more illustrative man-
ner, we statistically summarized the results of Studies 1, 2, 
and 3. The summary of the study results was performed in 
Comprehensive Meta-Analysis Software (CMA; Borenstein 
et al. 2013). We used Pearson’s r as a measure of the effect 
size and the sample size to calculate sampling variance. We 
fitted a fixed-effects model with the level of Want as a mod-
erator. The heterogeneity among the effects was significant 
[I2 = 60.86%; Q(5) = 12.76, p = 0.003] and expected, given 
the differences in studies designs.
Fig. 3  Model tested in Study 3
Fig. 4  Interactive effect of Want and Expectancy on donation (Study 3)
828 Motivation and Emotion (2020) 44:819–831
1 3
The results showed that the overall effect for the three 
studies followed the same pattern as the individual studies. 
To be specific, Expectancy was not associated with helping 
behaviors when Want levels were high (r =  − 0.02, p = 0.703, 
95% CI [− 0.10, 0.07]). However, it was significant and pos-
itive at lower levels of Want (r = 0.17, p < 0.001, 95% CI 
[0.09, 0.25]). These results are summarized in Fig. 5.
General discussion
The overall goal of this study was to gain a better under-
standing of the psychological underpinnings associated with 
helping people in need. We built on motivational readiness 
theory (Kruglanski et al. 2014) to test the role of Expectancy 
regarding the perceived effectiveness of helping in predict-
ing helping declarations as well as behavior. In line with 
the theoretical assumptions, we systematically demonstrated 
that, although a desire to help (Want) is the essential driver 
of helping, when this factor is low, both helping declarations 
(and behaviors) may still occur if the Expectancy is high 
that the aid provided will be impactful for the victim(s). 
Despite the fact that a similar notion was previously inves-
tigated by other researchers (e.g., Sargeant and Woodliffe 
2007; Erlandsson et al. 2014; Cryder et al. 2013a, b; Sharma 
and Morwitz 2016), in those studies, it was suggested that 
separate mechanisms underlay the act of helping a victim—
with emotional mechanisms being responsible for helping 
identified victims, and cognitive mechanisms being respon-
sible for helping statistical victims. We however have dem-
onstrated that both components are essential in predicting 
declared or actual help with the desire to help (Want) being 
the pivotal predictor of helping, irrespective of the levels of 
Expectancy that the helping action will be effective. How-
ever, when the desire to help (Want) is low, helping is still 
possible via high Expectancy. To the best of our knowledge, 
this is the first systematic demonstration of an interactive 
effect of cognitive and affective components in predicting 
helping intentions and behaviors.
However, we should also note that, although we treat 
Want and Expectancy as separate mechanisms, these factors 
are not independent. This line of thought is in accordance 
with the motivational readiness theory which assumes that 
a relation between the two components might exist. This 
is exemplified in ‘wishful thinking’: when a person really 
wants something and thus perceives it as more attainable, or 
when a person’s desire increases when they perceive some-
thing as easily attainable or readily available. Such a relation 
is also seen in our studies, in which we found a moderate 
correlation between the two variables (see also Caviola et al. 
2020). The correlations, however, suggest that these are still 
two distinct variables, and our further analyses show that 
they differentially predict helping motivation and behavior.
It is worth noting that in Study 2, although we found the 
expected effects on decision whether to donate, we didn’t 
find them on decision how much to donate. As mentioned 
above, it is consistent with other studies on actual dona-
tions, which demonstrated that the decision to donate dif-
fers from the decision on amount of the donation (Parsons 
2007; Karlan and Wood 2017; Bergh and Reinstein 2020). 
Also, Dickert et al. (2011) suggest that donation decisions 
should be regarded as two-stage process, in which the initial 
decision to donate (stage 1) is separated from the donation 
amounts (stage 2). Authors suggested that different emo-
tional mechanisms govern each stage (mood management 
in stage 1 and empathy in stage 2). However, in case of real 
(vs. hypothetical) donations other factors may play a role 
as well. As CAF’s report suggests (Charities Aid Founda-
tion 2019), over half of people donate money for altruistic 
purposes, but the amount of money given was influenced by 
one’s personal values, sense of morality, faith, etc. (Charity 
Aid Foundation 2014). Given that we did not focus on the 
individual differences in our studies (except from attitude 
toward money), we were able to detect an effect in stages 
Fig. 5  Summarization of Studies 1, 2 and 3 using meta-regression technique. Note in Study 2 the decision to donate (not the decision how much 
to donate) was included into the analysis
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1 and 2 in case of hypothetical donations, which are in fact 
only declarations, but not in case of real donations. In addi-
tion, we asked for donations only people who decided to 
donate (of 130 participants, 50 didn’t offer anything), which 
significantly reduced the sample size. Thus, it is possible 
that for this analysis our study was underpowered. Also, the 
variation of our dependent variable was quite small. Finally, 
there were differences between the format of the scales: in 
Study 1 the scales ranged between 0 and 100, but in Study 2 
between 0 and 20. It means, that in Study 2 the variation of 
the results was lower than in Study 1.
There are limitations to the research reported here. One 
limitation is that we used self-reported measures of desire 
to help (Want), and expectancy to satisfy this desire. Such 
measures always decrease the ecological validity of the 
studies, and because many scholars believe they exhibit less 
construct validity, they should be used with caution (Kuncel 
et al. 2005). In future studies, it would be beneficial to focus 
on more implicit measures—behavioral or psychophysi-
ological. It is also worth noting that we conceptualize Want 
in a rather general fashion, as the importance of helping. 
However, the desire to help might be determined by a variety 
of factors (e.g. sympathy, empathy, the desire to be perceived 
in a positive manner) which tap into the affective component 
to help. In future studies, it would be of benefit if Want was 
operationalized in a different way, with different sources of 
Want being measured.
Another limitation may reside in the fact that our research 
does not focus on the emotional mechanism underlying 
the desire to help. Thus, we simply demonstrated that in 
the case of our manipulation (the invariable cause of the 
victim’s plight was a disease) negative affect is related to 
the desire to help. As emotional reactions to victims may 
be influenced by the particular circumstances that victims 
are facing, future research should investigate emotional 
responses to victims experiencing various sorts of plights 
to corroborate the results of our studies. Besides, we also 
think that it is possible that after answering the questions 
about Want and Expectancy, participants would respond 
highly to giving/donating due to social desirability. Indeed, 
the participants presented high willingness to help (see the 
skewness of the donation variable). In the future studies, 
the role of social desirability needs to be tested to rule out 
this possibility. Finally, we believe that an additional study 
with manipulation of Want and Expectancy separately might 
make our argument stronger. There are two reasons however 
why we were reluctant to run additional study. First, in Stud-
ies 1 and 2 we tried to manipulate Want via identifiability. 
Above we discuss why this manipulation didn’t work and 
suggest that future research should investigate emotional 
responses to victims experiencing various sorts of plights. 
To meet this goal, we would have to change the procedure 
of the study completely, thus the new study wouldn’t fit to 
the present series of the studies. In fact, in the meantime 
we did additional study with completely different procedure 
when we manipulate Want. Although this time the manip-
ulation worked, and we replicate the previous results, we 
decided not to include this study into the paper to keep this 
paper more concise. However, we included this study into 
the Supplementary Material (see Study 0). Second, we also 
think that running the study about helping in COVID-19 
situation can heavily influence the results (e.g., the helping 
mindset might be currently more salient than before). Thus, 
the replication of the previous results using exact the same 
procedures wouldn’t be possible and the results wouldn’t be 
comparable with the previous studies as the social context 
has changed drastically.
From a pragmatic standpoint, our results suggest ways 
of designing an effective charitable fundraising or crisis 
relief campaigns, that is, campaigns that increase the audi-
ence’s willingness to donate to victims or bodies tasked with 
handling the crisis (e.g. COVID-19 pandemic). Our results 
suggest that the message should address the prospects of 
goal attainment if just evoking emotions with regards to the 
victim is not possible. Past studies have suggested that pre-
senting the victim by means of a photo depicting the victim’s 
circumstances (e.g., a photo of a hungry child expressing 
sadness) or with a specific background story about him/her 
(e.g., the hungry child’s parents died when he was 1 year 
old) will increase the audience’s emotional reactions to the 
victim’s plight, thereby also increasing their willingness 
to donate. Indeed, workers of non-governmental charities 
do their best to make people want to help others. However, 
other studies have demonstrated that many different factors 
can influence Want itself, such as outgroup biases (Stürmer 
et al. 2006), prejudices against some groups (Abrams et al. 
2016), and the identifiability of the person in need (Lee and 
Feeley 2016). It is difficult to successfully address all of 
these factors in any single charitable campaign. We sug-
gest that charitable actions could be more effective when 
their work focuses on enhancing Expectancy, especially if 
it is difficult to evoke a desire to help. As shown here, even 
when desire is low, helping behavior might still be possi-
ble when expectancy is high. Therefore, our recommenda-
tion for NGO’s, or any other fundraising organization, will 
be to always bear in mind that, by increasing the level of 
expectancy of success, the potential for helping behavior 
is thereby increased among donating recipients. This could 
be achieved, for example, by assuring the recipients that the 
money donated will be adequately invested, and that they 
will eventually obtain detailed information about how their 
donation helped. Indeed, recent studies show that informing 
people about effectiveness of the help increases donations, 
that is, charities presented as more effective are supported 
more compared to those presented as less effective (Caviola 
et al. 2020).
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Additionally, we argue that Expectancy is also crucial for 
public policy makers. Schelling (1968) pointed out that one 
of the biggest obstacles in effective policy decision-making 
is the identified victim effect, i.e., peoples’ tendency to pref-
erentially give to identified versus anonymous victims of 
misfortune. He argued that, from a normative point of view, 
this preference for identified vs. statistical (anonymous) vic-
tim exerts a considerable impact on how public funds are 
spent, often leading to ineffective uses of resources in the 
long run. This inefficiency is based on the fact that decision-
makers tend to maximize those goals which they consider 
to be the most valuable in the moment, as determined by 
affective reactions while overlooking more abstract goals, 
which are often of greater utilitarian value for society. We 
argue that increasing expectancy at this macro level (e.g., 
via training and workshops for health officials), can result in 
more utilitarian decision-making by reducing biases against 
prevention policies.
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